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Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!∗
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September 1, 2006
Abstract
In this paper we show that in a private value setting first-price auctions can be preferred
to second-price auctions. We consider a sequential auction of two objects with positive
synergies and compare both auction formats. Although the second-price auction performs
better in terms of efficiency and revenue, the first-price auction performs much better on
a so far neglected dimension. Namely, the probability that the winner of the first object
goes bankrupt is almost always higher when using the second-price rule. Our findings
therefore support the common use of first-price auctions, most notably for procurement.
JEL Classification Codes: D44 (Auctions), H57 (Procurement).
Keywords: Auction, Bankruptcy, Synergies, Procurement.
1 Introduction
In private value settings second-price sealed-bid auctions are generally preferred to first-price
sealed-bid auctions due to the desirable properties they have. First of all, the dominant
bidding strategy is truth-revealing and therefore does not require any information on the
situation or intention of competitors. Second, in equilibrium the auction is always guaranteed
to be efficient. Besides, the revenue-equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981) shows that the
expected revenues from both auction formats are identical under certain assumptions.
Still, second-price auctions are hardly observed in practice and several theoretical ex-
planations have been given for this. Rothkopf et al. (1990) argue that bidders might be
reluctant to reveal their true valuation, since this can have negative implications for future
auctions. Both in one-shot and repeated settings, collusion among bidders is less stable in
first-price auctions than in second-price auctions (see for instance Robinson (1985), Fehl and
Gu¨th (1987), and Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004)). Finally, when bidders are risk-averse or
when their valuations are asymmetrically distributed, the revenue-equivalence theorem does
not hold anymore. Holt (1980) shows that when bidders are risk-averse the first-price auc-
tion generates higher revenues since bidders then shade their bids less. When the valuation
∗We would like to thank conference participants of EARIE 2006 for comments and suggestions.
†Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
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distribution of one type of bidders stochastically dominates that of the other type of bid-
ders, Maskin and Riley (2000) show that a first-price auction generates more revenue than a
second-price. However in such a situation the first-price auction is not efficient anymore.
This paper also discusses asymmetries between the valuation distributions of two bidders
but here the asymmetry is not exogenously given. We analyze a sequential auction of two
objects in which positive synergies are present and compare the first- and second-price format.
We find that both the efficiency and total revenue are then higher for the second-price auction.
However, we also observe that bidders are more likely to receive a negative payoff under this
auction format, which induces a higher probability on bankruptcy.
Many auction settings can be characterized as being sequential in nature and synergies are
often present in such settings. The theoretical literature on sequential auctions with synergies
only focusses on price trends. Branco (1997) shows that in a sequential auction of homoge-
neous objects a decreasing price trend, better known as the declining price anomaly, can be
explained by the presence of positive synergies. Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002) extent this
result to sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects. Leufkens et al. (2006) are
the first to not only consider price trends and revenues, but also the consequences for bidders.
In standard private value auctions it is not very interesting to analyze the consequences for
bidders since they will never make losses. However, in presence of positive synergies this is not
guaranteed anymore since auction participants bid above their valuations. Negative payoffs
can lead to bankruptcy, particularly for auctions where potential synergies are high, which
has disastrous effects on welfare. Especially for procurement auctions this is important, since
governments are not only interested in revenues but also the social consequences.
2 The model
We consider a private value auction of two objects. The objects are auctioned sequentially
and the auction rules are identical in both auctions.1 Two risk-neutral bidders participate in
both auctions and for each object their valuation is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
Valuations are individually uncorrelated and drawn independently according to this distribu-
tion. Furthermore, the valuation for the second object is not known during the auction of
the first object. After each auction bidders are informed whether or not they won the object.
The bid and valuation in auction k of bidder i are denoted by bki and vki. We incorporate
the presence of positive synergies by multiplying the second auction valuation with a factor
s > 1 if the first auction is won. Although the valuation for the second object is not known
during the first auction, bidders know that winning the first object increases this valuation
from v2i to s v2i and thus increases their expected payoff of the second auction.
Our setting represents a recurring auction like the annual auctioning of contracts for
1Although most applications are in procurement settings, we follow the convention and analyze ‘highest
bid wins’ auctions for expositional ease and without loss of generality.
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public services. The exact details of future contracts are not specified yet and therefore
contracts are considered as a priori identical. Attributing the benefits from synergies only
to the second object makes sense considering the order in which projects are executed. For
instance, expertise is created during the first project and this gives benefits for the second, or
specialized equipment is needed which then does not need to be acquired for a possible second
project. Although we stress here the procurement setting for public contracts explicitly, the
setting may find its application in other situations such as spectrum auctions where bidders
benefit from a win in one area in the creation of a domain consisting of multiple contiguous
areas.
Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002) and Tang Sørensen (2006) consider similar settings. Tang
Sørensen (2006) only discusses a second-price sealed-bid auction and models positive synergies
as a constant that is added to the value of the second object. A weakness in this approach
is that the marginal synergy is infinite if the valuation is close to zero (see Menezes and
Monteiro (2004)). In Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002) benefitting from positive synergies
means that the valuation is uniformly distributed on [0,2] instead of [0,1]. Our way of modeling
synergies ensures there is an observable relationship between the benefits from synergies and
the intrinsic value of the second object. In both aforementioned articles the focus is only on
revenues and price trends whereas we are interested in the wider (social) consequences the
presence of positive synergies has.
3 First-price sealed-bid
Theorem 1 For a sequential first-price sealed-bid auction with independent, individually un-
correlated valuations, two risk-neutral bidders, two objects and a synergy factor s > 1, the
bidding strategies given by
b∗1i(v1i) =
1
2v1i +∆ with ∆ =
s2
s2−1
{
1
2s− 1− 1s + 12 1s2 + 12
arcsinh(
√
s2−1)+arcsin( 1
s
√
s2−1)√
s2−1
}
and
b∗2i(v2i) =

v2i
1+
√
1−(1− 1
s2
)v22i
if auction 1 is lost;
s v2i
1+
√
1+(1− 1
s2
)(s v2i)2
if auction 1 is won
constitute a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix. 
The factor ∆ in the theorem is the option value effect of winning the first auction. This
option value is precisely the difference in expected instantaneous payoffs for the second auc-
tion, before knowing the second auction valuation, between winning and losing. In line with
intuition, the option value effect is increasing in the synergy factor.
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If the option value ∆ exceeds half of the valuation for the first object, bidders bid above
their private valuation and as a consequence the winner of the first auction can make a
negative first auction instantaneous payoff. For values of the synergy factor above 1.8179
(when ∆ > 13), the expected first auction instantaneous payoff is negative. For synergy
factors even above 2.2113 (when ∆ > 12), bidders are guaranteed to make a loss in the first
auction.
Losses that are made in the first auction can, but are not guaranteed to, be recovered in
the second auction. In case the first auction winner is not able to recover its loss in the second
auction, bankruptcy results. Figure 1 displays the probability that bankruptcy occurs in the
first-price sealed-bid sequential auction with positive synergies as a function of the synergy
factor.
-
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Figure 1: The probability of bankruptcy as a function of s.
The presence of synergies causes the second auction to be asymmetric. Asymmetric first-price
sealed-bid auctions are known to possess inefficiencies even if bidders have the same attitude
towards risk. The second-price counterpart never possesses such inefficiencies, regardless of
asymmetries and differences in attitudes towards risk. As a consequence, in addition to
possible ex post inefficiencies due to absence of hindsight in future valuations, even ex ante
inefficiencies can be observed. To be more specific, the inefficiency that can occur is that the
loser of the first auction can win the second auction although that the synergy-adjusted value
of the first auction winner is higher.
4 Second-price sealed-bid
Theorem 2 For a sequential second-price sealed-bid auction with independent, individually
uncorrelated valuations, two risk-neutral bidders, two objects and a synergy factor s > 1, the
bidding strategies given by
b∗1i(v1i) = v1i +∆ with ∆ =
1
2s− 12
and
b∗2i(v2i) =
{
v2i if auction 1 is lost;
s v2i if auction 1 is won
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constitute a unique symmetric linear equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
Proof. See Leufkens et al. (2006). 
As in the previous section, the factor ∆ represents the option value effect of winning the first
auction and equals the difference in expected instantaneous payoffs for the second auction
between winning and losing the first auction before the second auction valuation is known.
Also here the option value effect is increasing in the synergy factor.
Bidders always overbid due to the fact that ∆ is positive. This does not imply that the
first auction winner makes a loss in the first auction, since the price is determined by the
losing bidder. Nevertheless, losses can be made. An instantaneous loss is guaranteed if the
auction is won and the option value ∆ exceeds the private valuation. For synergy factors
exceeding 1.6667 (when ∆ > 13) the expected first auction instantaneous payoff is negative
and for synergy factors larger than 3 (when ∆ > 1) instantaneous losses are always made.
Again, losses that are made in the first auction can, but are not guaranteed to, be recovered
in the second auction and bankruptcy problems can be observed. Figure 2 displays the
probability that bankruptcy occurs in the second-price sealed-bid sequential auction with
positive synergies as a function of the synergy factor.
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Figure 2: The probability on bankruptcy as a function of s.
As already mentioned, in contrast to the first-price counterpart, ex ante efficiencies are guar-
anteed not to occur here. Ex post inefficiencies due to the lack of perfect foresight concerning
future valuations are still possible.
5 A Comparison between both formats
In Figure 3 the difference in bankruptcy probabilities between the second-price auction and
the first-price auction is displayed for different values for the synergy factor. The values in
this figure are found by subtracting the value in Figure 1 from the value in Figure 2 for each
s. We see that for almost all values of s the difference is positive, meaning that for almost
all synergy factors bankruptcy is more likely to occur in the second-price auction than in the
first-price auction.
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Figure 3: Difference in bankruptcy probability between the two formats.
Figure 4 displays the difference in the likelihood by which inefficiencies occur between the first-
price auction and the second-price auction format. Owing to the efficiency of the second-price
auction, the difference is precisely the likelihood by which the first-price auction is inefficient.
We see that the probability on an inefficient outcome is bounded from above by 8.6%.
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Figure 4: Difference in the probability on inefficiency between the two formats.
From the two figures above we can conclude that for only a small region of the synergy factor
the second-price auction performs better on both efficiency and bankruptcy. For all remaining
values of the synergy factor the first-price auction performs better regarding bankruptcy but
is outperformed by the second-price auction regarding efficiency.
The smaller probability on bankruptcy in a first-price auction is a consequence of the
inefficiency in the second auction. The only kind of inefficiency that can occur in the second
auction of the first-price auction is that the loser of the first auction wins even though the
(synergy adjusted) valuation of the first auction’s winner is higher. This inefficiency has a
negative impact on the option value effect of winning the first auction. In a second-price
auction this inefficiency does not exist and consequently the factor ∆ is always larger than
for a first-price auction (see Gu¨th et al. (2005)). Hence in the first-price auction the bidding
competition will be less fierce in the first auction and consequently decreases the probability
on bankruptcy.
As predicted by Maskin and Riley (2000), the expected revenue from the second auction
is higher for the first-price auction. The expected revenue from the first auction is higher
for the second-price auction since the factor ∆ is always larger. The total revenue from both
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auctions is larger for the second-price auction but can be shown to be never more than 4%
above that from the first-price auction.
6 Conclusion
In our sequential auction with synergies second-price sealed-bid auctions are always efficient
whereas first-price sealed-bid auctions are not. Also, the total revenue from the second-price
auction is higher. Still, a first-price auction can be preferred since the probability that the
winner of the first object goes bankruptcy is almost always smaller. In theory second-price
auctions are generally preferred for private value settings and we have shown that when
complementarities are present this should not necessarily be the case. Our findings support
the common use of first-price auctions, most notably for procurement settings.
For the second-price format the analysis can be extended to n ≥ 2 bidders and a general
cumulative distribution function for the valuations (see Leufkens et al. (2006)). For the
first-price format we need to assume a cumulative distribution function to get a closed-form
solution for the equilibrium bidding strategies. A closed-from solution for the equilibrium
bidding strategy for an asymmetric first-price auction with more than two bidders has not
been found so far. Therefore we are not able to extend the comparison to more than two
bidders or a general distribution function.
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Appendix
The expected instantaneous payoff of auction 1 for bidder i prior to the realization of the
valuations for this auction is denoted by p¯i1i. The expected instantaneous payoff of auction
2 for bidder i, p¯i2i, is prior to the realization of the valuations for this auction but given the
outcome of the first auction. The winner and loser of the first auction are referred to as
respectively bidder w and ` in the second auction.
Proof to Theorem 1
1. Second auction bid functions. The bid functions follow directly from Plum (1992).
2. The factor ∆. Note that both second auction bid functions are strictly increasing functions
on [0, 1] with minimum value 0 and maximum value ss+1 . The first auction winner’s bid
coincides with the first auction loser’s bid if and only if
b∗w(vw) = b∗` (v`) ⇐⇒ vw = 1s v`√1−(1− 1
s2
)v2`
or v` = s vw√
1+(1− 1
s2
)(s vw)2
Therefore, in equilibrium, the expected instantaneous payoffs for the second auction after
having learned the second auction valuation are
p¯i∗w(vw) = (s vw − b∗w(vw)) · Pr{b∗w(vw) ≥ b∗`(v`)} = (s vw)
2
1+
√
1+(1− 1
s2
)(s vw)2
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for the first auction winner, and
p¯i∗` (v`) = (v` − b∗` (v`)) · Pr{b∗` (v`) ≥ b∗w(vw)} =
v2`
1+
√
1−(1− 1
s2
)v2`
1
s
for the first auction loser. Hence, the expected instantaneous payoffs for the second auction
before knowing the second auction valuation are
p¯i∗w =
∫ 1
0
p¯i∗w(vw) dvw =
∫ 1
0
(s vw)2
1+
√
1+(1− 1
s2
)(s vw)2
dvw
3=
∫ 1
0
(s vw)2
[
1−
√
1+(1− 1
s2
)(s vw)2
]
1−(1+(1− 1
s2
)(s vw)2)
dvw
=
∫ 1
0
√
1+(1− 1
s2
)(s vw)2−1
(1− 1
s2
)
dvw = s
2
s2−1
{∫ 1
0
√
1 + (s2 − 1)v2w dvw − 1
}
6= s
2
s2−1
{[
1
2vw
(√
1 + (s2 − 1)v2w + arcsinh(
√
s2−1)√
s2−1
)]1
0
− 1
}
= s
2
s2−1
{
1
2s+
1
2
arcsinh(
√
s2−1)√
s2−1 − 1
}
for the winner,2 and
p¯i∗` =
∫ 1
0
p¯i∗` (v`) dv` =
∫ 1
0
v2`
1+
√
1−(1− 1
s2
)v2`
1
s dv`
3=
∫ 1
0
v2`
[
1−
√
1−(1− 1
s2
)v2`
]
1−(1−(1− 1
s2
)v2` )
1
s dv`
=
∫ 1
0
1−
√
1−(1− 1
s2
)v2`
(1− 1
s2
)
1
s dv` =
s
s2−1
{
1−
∫ 1
0
√
1− (1− 1
s2
)v2` dv`
}
6= s
s2−1
1−
[
1
2v`
(√
1− (1− 1
s2
)v2` +
arcsin(
√
1− 1
s2
)√
1− 1
s2
)]1
0

= 1
s2−1
{
s− 12 − 12
s2arcsin( 1
s
√
s2−1)√
s2−1
}
for the loser.3
The option value effect of winning the first auction ∆ is therefore equal to the difference
in expected instantaneous payoffs for the second auction before knowing the second auction
valuation between winning and losing. Hence,
∆ = p¯i∗w − p¯i∗` = s
2
s2−1
{
1
2s− 1− 1s + 12 1s2 + 12
arcsinh(
√
s2−1)+arcsin( 1
s
√
s2−1)√
s2−1
}
3. First auction bid functions. The effective first auction valuation has two components: (1)
the value of the first object, and (2) the option value of winning. This means that the effective
2Here equality 3 is obtained by multiplying the nominator and denominator by 1 −
√
1 + (1− 1
s2
)(s vw)2
and equality 6 is obtained by realizing that 1
2
x(
√
1 + ax2 + arcsinh(
√
a)√
a
) is the antiderivative of
√
1 + ax2.
3Here equality 3 is obtained by multiplying the nominator and denominator by 1 −
√
1− (1− 1
s2
)v2` and
equality 6 is obtained by realizing that 1
2
x(
√
1− ax2 + arcsin(
√
a)√
a
) is the antiderivative of
√
1− ax2.
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valuations are uniformly distributed over the interval [∆,∆+ 1]. The bid functions stated in
the theorem follow directly from here.
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